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Despite its costs and limited effectiveness, the
European Neighbourhood Policy’s symbolic
commitment to engage beyond the EU may mean that
it is doomed to survive.
Set up to promote security and prosperity in the EU’s neighbors, the European
Neighbourhood Policy has struggled in recent years to cope with the pace of
change in the region.  Giulia Pastorella argues that recent events such as the
Arab Spring illustrate the ineffectiveness of the policy, with many countries making
little progress. While reform is badly needed, budget squeezes, more assertive
Middle Eastern regimes and a lack of political will within the EU all mean that it is
likely that the policy will continue relatively unchanged for the time being.
Of the many sticks and carrots which make up Europe’s soft power, the European Neighbourhood
Policy (ENP) has arguably been the least effective. Established in 2004 and funded from the EU
budget, the ENP was set up to help build an arc of security and prosperity to the EU’s east and
south, and to prevent new divisions between the haves and have-nots which could destabilise the
regions on the EU’s borders. Who could object to a ‘structured dialogue’ in the service of stability
and security for all, and a better life quality for the peoples of the former Soviet Union, the Levant
and North Africa?
The logic was irresistible – or so it seemed. And the case for bringing sixteen countries closer to
the EU (but not too close) seemed impeccable. But, measured against the ENP’s ambition to be an
enabler of real change, it is clear that its record to date has, at best, been one of trying to keep pace
with the spontaneous changes which are sweeping the region to the EU’s south, and the forces of
inertia which are still weighing down on the former communist countries to its east. At worst, the
EU’s actions have been a case of too little, too late. To illustrate: recipient countries like Moldova
and Belarus have made little or no progress in eight years, whilst others such as Ukraine have
actually seen their democratic momentum go into reverse.
Setting aside such ongoing stalemates, the latest, most graphic example of ineffectiveness has
been the Arab Spring. While the civil society networks and exposure to European values stimulated
by ENP initiatives may have contributed to the spread of democratic ideas, it is clear that these
have been of marginal importance. The problem is not only, as former Commission president
Romano Prodi has said optimistically, that the EU is offering ‘everything but institutions’: it is also
offering very little practical support, not least in the form of  money.
The ENP’s effectiveness is further hampered by political arguments between the member states,
and by the intrinsic shortcomings of conditionality (offering rewards for domestic reforms) as a tool
for real change. Those shortcomings were cruelly exposed in the case of the Middle East’s
autocracies, such regimes being particularly resistant to conditionality – not least when it has been
‘business as usual’ until the day before. The EU commissioner for Enlargement and ENP Štefan
Füle has been honest enough to recognise that Europe has been sending out conflicting messages
about its priorities, and insisted that “ we have changed our approach and there is today much less
tension between our interests and our values.” Without doubt the beginning of wisdom, but time is
not on the EU’s side if it is to build its regional standing and engage effectively with Arab societies.
But surely the ENP can be improved and take its rightful place in the EU’s foreign policy toolkit?
Can member states not harness their political will, and put money where the mouth is? The omens
are not good: the EU’s budget for 2014-2020, currently under negotiation, is unlikely to see a useful
increase the resources available for the ENP.  But political will and financial resources are just one
part of the equation. We have to remember that ENP is a “joint ownership” policy, in which the EU
and its partner countries participate on an equal footing. And the fact is that the new regimes of the
Middle East are likely to become increasingly assertive in their foreign policies and geopolitical
orientations. This represents an opportunity for the EU, but also a challenge, for the old certainties –
such as a ‘ default’ alignment with western interests – can no longer be taken for granted. Whilst
Tunisia has joined the International Criminal Court, Egypt has restored its relationship with Iran.
Against this sobering background, we are entitled to ask some searching questions. If both sides –
donors and recipients – have little incentive to continue, and if the policy is costing money and
achieving little, what prevents us all from admitting that we were wrong, and that the ENP should
now be quietly binned? Would it not make more sense to leave European action to member states;
to encourage the private sector to seek out investment opportunities; and to concentrate on other
EU instruments, such as intensified diplomacy and security and defence (ESDP) missions? The
most useful elements of ENP have been borrowed from the EU’s enlargement policies, from its
development aid strategy, and from its defence and security activity. So it should be relatively easy
to break it up again and to return each chapter to its appropriate policy area.
The main explanation for the current inertia is to be found in the EU’s self-image, and in the need to
not betray that image in the courtroom of world opinion. Reputation is the key word, and Ian
Manner’s much quoted expression “normative power Europe” is another. Having consolidated
peace and prosperity within its own borders, the EU has always seen itself as engaged in a
universal mission to export its own success by supporting democracy, the rule of law, honest and
efficient institutions and human rights, along with policies that boost human welfare and prosperity.
The new, treaty-based (Article 8) obligation to export the Union’s values to its borderlands has,
indirectly, given a constitutional justification to ENP that will reinforce the EU Commission in the
‘path-dependency ‘of its policy. The pressure is now on to deliver some tangible successes through
the ENP, and to be seen to be doing so, for the sake of the EU’s credibility.
But there is another reason why the ENP may yet be doomed to survive. It is that the symbolic
commitment to engage beyond the EU’s actual frontiers sends a signal of good will and solidarity
whose value easily surpasses the concrete achievements of the policy. That commitment has built a
political capital that would be difficult to rebuild if the ENP were to be scrapped. It would be as if the
EU were telling the benighted peoples of its ‘ near abroad ‘ that it had stopped caring about them –
and they – and, crucially, their governments – would draw the obvious conclusion, and orientate their
policies in ways which could prove more costly to Europe.
There are costs attached to dismantling any policy or institution, even if these are not altogether
evident at the time – and these are costs to all the parties involved.  Sometimes the price is worth
paying. But it seems we are not there yet with the ENP.  Neither side can bring itself to walk away,
even if (maybe because) they know that most of real life will take place elsewhere. Which is not
necessarily the best endorsement of a policy.
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